Introduction
The existence of an inverse relationship between farm size and output per unit of land is one of the most widely quoted empirical regularities in agricultural production economics. First identified descriptively in Russia (Chayanov 1926) , then confirmed by Indian farm management studies (Bardhan 1973; Srinivasan 1972) , and subsequently supported by a much larger set of countries (Berry and Cline 1979) , the relationship proved robust to numerous challenges. These include, but are not limited to, better accounting for land quality and soil characteristics, use of profits instead of output, more precise plot area estimates using GPS, and use of more sophisticated panel estimation techniques.
Barring measurement error, the most likely explanation for this phenomenon is market imperfections. But the question of which markets are affected, how amenable they are to change, and if or how policies may address such imperfections has been less extensively explored in the literature. To take just one example, the inverse relationship has been used to recommend redistributive land reform to improve efficiency and equity (Lipton 2009 ). This has been difficult to implement, and such policy advice may need to be reassessed if higher nonagricultural wages or technology affects factor price ratios, supervision requirements, and the presence and extent of market imperfections that might have caused the relationship in the first place.
Some also noted that the relationship may be weakening over time, for example, due to rising nonagricultural wages, out-migration from rural areas, and imperfections in land markets, so that continued subdivision in the context of generational change may limit the scope for mechanization, contributing to a reversal of the inverse relationship by making some farms (or, more accurately, plots) too small for efficient cultivation (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010) . Recent innovations in crop breeding, tillage, and information technology are widely believed to make agricultural production more knowledge intensive, thus potentially eliminating part of Land Economics small farmers' traditional advantage. But the cross-sectional evidence or short panels used in most studies on the subject may not allow precise identification of such relationships. Instead, longitudinal data at the household level would be needed to allow testing of how the farm size-productivity relationship evolves in response to changes in technology and market functioning.
To provide such insights, this paper draws on a three-round panel data set from close to 5,000 farm households in 17 Indian states over a 25-year period (1982-2008) . In the period covered by our data, India's economy experienced dramatic changes, the magnitude of which differed considerably across states; providing a source of identification that is not available to cross sections. 1 To explore changes in the inverse relationship over time and test different explanations for it, we use panel regressions based on pooling data from all three rounds of our survey (1982, 1999, and 2008) , instrumenting size of cultivated area and focusing in particular on the role of labor market imperfections. This allows us to significantly expand on studies that explored the relationship from a cross-sectional perspective or with much shorter panels.
Results from nonparametric and parametric regressions point toward an attenuation of the inverse farm size-productivity relationship over the period studied, consistent with what was found in Vietnam from 1992 to 2008 (Liu, Violette, and Barrett 2016) . To understand mechanisms that may underpin such changes, we note that higher wage levels in the 2000s may have increased demand for fertilizer and machinery as a substitute for labor. In this case, production could have become more capital intensive, possibly weakening the supervision cost advantage of family labor. Indeed, panel labor demand functions support this notion: they point toward a significant and positive ratio of family to hired labor in the 1982 and the 1999 rounds that turns insignificant in the 2008 round, consistent with the notion that equality of productivity between family and hired labor overall can no longer be rejected statistically in the last period covered by our data.
Greater importance of capital and purchased inputs implies increase standardization of tasks, reducing the importance of supervision (by family labor) and increasing the substitutability between own and hired labor, so that households' labor endowment would be less important in determining the intensity of labor use in agricultural production. Indeed, our data suggest that presence of labor market imperfections lead to a rejection of separability between households' labor endowment and their labor demand in the first and, to a lesser extent, the second, but no longer in the third period. Consistent with the notion that the functioning of labor markets improved over time, we find that in the third period, separability is still rejected in villages with inactive nonagricultural labor markets, providing a possible explanation for finding a weak inverse relationship between farm size and productivity even in this period.
Better labor market functioning thus provides a coherent explanation of the weakening of the negative farm size-productivity relationship over time in India that is evident in our data. From a policy perspective, this implies that efforts to improve rural factor market functioning will be an appropriate policy response. Partly as a result of redistributive land reform efforts, land rental continues to be restricted in most Indian states. Thus, while the incidence of transfers has increased somewhat over time, most transactions are restricted to close kin. Given the improvements in factor market operation observed in our data, efforts to allow land market operation could provide significant equity as well as efficiency benefits.
Motivation and Relevance
This section draws on the conceptual and empirical literature to document strong empirical evidence in support of a negative farm sizeproductivity relationship and to discuss potential channels underpinning it. If an inverse relationship between productivity and farm size can be attributed to labor market imper-fections, one would expect the relationship to weaken as agricultural production becomes more capital intensive and nonagricultural labor demand increases, and longitudinal data spanning a long enough period should uncover such patterns.
The Farm Size-Productivity Relationship
A negative relation between farm size and output per unit of land in unmechanized agriculture has been confirmed many times in the literature (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2010) . It was first noted in Russia (Chayanov 1926) , then in Indian farm management studies (Bardhan 1973; Srinivasan 1972) , and in a host of other countries using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (Berry and Cline 1979) that likely failed to fully control for land quality (Bhalla and Roy 1988 ). Yet, even when these shortcomings are addressed, the inverse relationship has remained surprisingly robust. Correcting for measurement errors may weaken the relationship, but it does not invalidate it (Lamb 2003) . In fact, use of panel estimation techniques (Assunção and Braido 2007) or careful controls for soil quality affected the magnitude but not the existence of the relationship (Barrett, Bellemare, and Hou 2010) . Although biased estimates of area cultivated by farmers may reinforce the inverse relationship, it persists even when objective, GPS-based measures of area cultivated are used (Calogero, Savastano, and Zezza 2011) . Use of profits rather than output per hectare in India has the same result, namely, the relation weakens but does not disappear (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993) . The relationship is also not limited to South Asia; a recent study finds that in Mexico, large farms have a lower value of output per hectare than small farms and produce further away from the efficiency frontier (Kagin, Taylor, and Yúnez-Naude 2016) .
Conceptually, imperfections in land, labor, and credit or insurance markets affect the relationship between farm size and productivity. If, as suggested by most empirical studies, the agricultural production function is characterized by constant returns to scale (Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013) , imperfections in two markets-that is, those for land and labor-will generate a systematic relationship between size of cultivated area and output (Feder 1985) . Use of family labor can resolve some of the informational asymmetries widely observed in rural labor markets (Bharadwaj 2015) . If hired labor is used, owner-operators, who are residual claimants to profit, will be more likely to exert effort than will wage workers, who, in light of the dispersion of agricultural production processes over space and time, may thus require supervision by family labor (Frisvold 1994) . This dispersion can generate a negative relationship between productivity and size as the ratio of hired to family labor increases with farm size. Owner-operators' advantage could be further enhanced by their knowledge of local soil and climatic conditions, which may have been accumulated over generations (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985) .
Small farmers' advantages in labor supervision, knowledge, and the ability to adjust to labor demand can be offset by the difficulties they may face in accessing capital and insurance, arising from the high transaction cost of providing formal credit in rural markets, possibly exacerbated by the difficulty of small farms to provide collateral. Frictions created by fixed costs of participating in labor or land markets could motivate small farmers who are unable to rent out land, so as to equalize marginal returns from use of family labor to the wage rate, to apply family labor to their fixed land endowment more intensively than would be the case in a situation where such markets function perfectly. An inverse relationship can also emerge if labor and credit market imperfections are combined with a fixed cost element for production (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986) or if there is heterogeneity in farmers' skills in the presence of credit market imperfections (Assunção and Ghatak 2003) . Land and insurance market imperfections can prompt small farmers who are net buyers of food to use family labor more intensively in an attempt to reduce potentially adverse effects of price fluctuations (Barrett 1996) . The lumpiness of certain inputs (e.g., machinery, draft animals, and management skills) together with the advantages in getting access to working capital or their capacity to diffuse risk may, in practice, lead the relation-
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ship between farm size and productivity to be U-shaped (Heltberg 1998) . As a result, with few exceptions, 2 agricultural production continues to rely on owner-operated firms (Allen and Lueck 1998; Deininger and Feder 2001) . 3 Although supervision constraints can account for the inverse relationship if hired labor is used, off-farm labor market rationing that constrains opportunities for smallholders' participation can provide an alternative explanation (Benjamin 1992) . If this is a binding constraint, farmers with more abundant labor endowment relative to cultivated land would apply more labor per unit of land, leading to a negative relationship between farm size and productivity. Such imperfections, while often taken as exogenously given in cross-sectional studies, will vary with time and the way in which family labor is valued. 4 Although labor market imperfections will strengthen the negative relationship, capital market imperfections are likely to result in the opposite outcome. Lumpiness of certain technologies such as bullocks or tractors that cannot easily be addressed via factor markets may attenuate small farmers' advantage. Rising wages may make substitution of capital for labor desirable even without changes in technology (Yamauchi 2016) . Technical change via innovations in crop breeding, tillage, and information technology (Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013) may reduce su-2 A well-known exception to the advantages of owneroperated units of production over those relying on wage labor is in perishable plantation crops. For such crops, economies of scale in processing may be transmitted to the production stage (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986) , and employment is often year-round, so that the optimum size of a unit is determined by the factory's processing capacity.
3 As of the end of 2009, only seven publicly listed farming companies existed worldwide-three in South America and four in Ukraine and Russia (Deininger et al. 2011 ). This contrasts with processing and input industries, and sometimes output markets, all of which are characterized by large fixed costs (such as for research and development or processing) that give rise to economies of scale and often a highly concentrated industry structure (Deininger and Byerlee 2012) . 4 In Rwanda, a very strong negative relationship between farm size and productivity weakens or is completely eliminated if family labor is valued at shadow or market wages, respectively (Ali and Deininger 2015) . pervision requirements further. 5 Information technology may improve smallholders' competitive position at the marketing stage (Aker and Fafchamps 2014) . More intensive use of technology at the production stage will require capital. If, for example, the transaction cost of providing formal credit in rural markets-which could possibly be exacerbated by constraints on those markets' ability to post collateral due to lack of formal documentation-may cause small farmers to have difficulty in accessing capital; thus, the inverse relation may actually be reversed. In fact, it has been shown that in India, large benefits may be forgone due to land market imperfections that make it impossible to assemble parcel sizes large enough to allow mechanization (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010) .
The above suggests that magnitude and possibly direction of the relation between farm size and productivity will vary in response to exogenous factors including nonfarm labor demand, availability of technology, and the functioning of capital markets. These factors, together with policy, will affect factor prices, the optimum ratio of capital to labor used in production, supervision needs, and the extent of market imperfections that have traditionally given rise to the inverse farm size-productivity relationship (Otsuka, Liu, and Yamauchi 2013) . This finding is illustrated by the differential effect of the increased importance of knowledge and capital in the wake of the green revolution (Deolalikar 1981) , which weakened the farm sizeproductivity relationship in districts suited to new technology but left it intact, with small producers most efficient, where traditional methods prevailed.
5 Pest-resistant and herbicide-tolerant varieties facilitated broad adoption of zero tillage and, by reducing the number of steps in the production process as well as the labor intensity of cultivation, allowed management of larger areas. The ability to have machinery operations guided by GPS technology reduces skill requirements and allows remote supervision. The scope for substituting crop and pest models and remotely sensed information on field conditions for personal observation also reduces the advantage of local knowledge (Deininger and Byerlee 2012) .
Data and Descriptive Statistics
To empirically address this issue, we use data from the 1982, 1999, and 2008 rounds of the Additional Rural Incomes Survey and Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (ARIS/ REDS), a panel survey covering 242 villages in 17 Indian states conducted by India's National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER). 6 Each round's household schedule provides data on demographics, assets, income, consumption, and economic activities at the household level, as well as detailed information on labor and nonlabor inputs used in agriculture and outputs from agricultural production. In case of splits, 7 all of a household's successors in the same village were interviewed. We limited our analysis sample to dynasties that were interviewed in all three rounds.
Over the 25-year period covered by the data, India's economy experienced far-reaching changes. Although growth rates remained well below 5% in the 1980s, liberalization in the early 1990s resulted in much stronger economic growth, largely driven by the nonfarm economy. As a result, from 1980 to 2010, real per capita gross domestic product (in 2000 U.S. dollars) grew from $225 to $786, and the share of the population in agriculture decreased from 63% to 48%, reaching a point at which the nonfarm sector employed close to 40% of the country's rural workforce (Himanshu et al. 2013) . Although land market imperfections impact nonagricultural productivity (Duranton et al. 2015a ), functioning of credit markets improved markedly since the 1990s (Duranton et al. 2015b) . From 2006 to 2008, the national rural employment guarantee 6 The sample included three strata: (1) districts that were part of the Intensive Agricultural District Program, an extension and input provision program placed in areas thought to have high potential for crop productivity growth; (2) districts covered by the Intensive Agricultural Area Programme; and (3) all other districts. 7 The 1999 round covered a total of 7,474 households, including all original households and their split-offs. The 2008 round (for the 2007-2008 season) has a sample size of 8,659 households from 242 villages and includes all households surveyed in 1999, the split-off households residing within these villages, and a set of randomly selected new households. scheme contributed to a significant increase in rural labor demand, which increased reservation wages (Imbert and Papp 2015a) , reduced seasonal migration (Imbert and Papp 2015b) , and resulted in some crop diversification. Inheritance-induced subdivision led to a significant decrease of plot size, below the point at which mechanization is possible, giving rise to inefficient patterns of cultivation (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010) .
Appendix Table A1 includes sample means for key variables in each survey round. Although mean household size dropped from 7.4 in 1982 to 5.7 in 2008, the head's level of education more than doubled from 2.2 to 5.0 years. As a result of population growth, mean land endowments declined markedly, from 8.6 to 4.5 acres. At the same time, real wage rates more than tripled, from 15 (16) , the share of households that hired machine services or owned a machine themselves increased from 51% (7%) to 74% (32%), whereas the share of households that neither owned nor hired tractors decreased from 49% to 26%. The data also point toward a significant increase in off-farm labor opportunities, with the share of farmers who worked in nonfarm wage or self-employment increasing from low levels (6% each, respectively) to 20% and 18%, respectively, and the share of income from agriculture decreasing from 84% in 192 to 61% in 2008. Even though incidence of land rental participation increased marginally (from 2.4% in 1982 to 6.1% in 2008), this is nowhere close to the rates of land lease market participation observed in other countries (Swinnen and Vranken 2005) mainly because of continued legal restrictions on the operation of such markets.
Appendix Table A2 presents the same variables by size of cultivated land area for small (less than 2.0 acres), medium (2.0-6.0 acres), and large (more than 6.0 acres) farms. Although it is not surprising to find that large Land Economics farmers' income was about triple that of small farmers throughout, large farms also obtained a much higher share of income (94% in 1982, 77% in 1999, and 81% in 2008) from agriculture in all three survey years. Household size dropped over time for all farm size classes, with declines from 8.4 in 1982 to 6.6 in 2008 for large, 6.8 to 5.7 for medium, and 5.9 to 5.3 for small farms. The share of agricultural income in total income declined across all farm sizes, with 51% in 1982 to 34% in 2008 for small, and 72% to 58% for medium farms, the decline was relatively bigger for the small and medium farms but changed only little (from 94% to 81%) for the large ones.
Possibly in response to higher wages, farms of all sizes shifted from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive modes of production. Although this change affected all farm sizes, it was most pronounced for large farms: from 1982 to 2008, small, medium, and large farms decreased labor days per acre by 48%, 54%, and 64%, respectively. The share of farms owning machinery, however, increased drastically over the survey periods, with rates of increase more pronounced for larger farm sizes. Compared to few small and medium farms (1% and 3%, respectively) owning machinery in 1982, 18% and 38%, respectively, did so in 2008; machinery ownership for large farms increased from 13% in 1982 to 33% in 1999 and then to 52% in 2008. A similar increase is observed in the rate of renting machinery, although the rate of increase is more similar across farm size groups.
Changes in the Farm SizeProductivity Relationship and Factor Demand over Time
Nonparametric and parametric regressions suggest that the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity was attenuated over time to the point at which it had almost disappeared at the end of the 1982-2008 period. Estimates of factor demand suggest that higher wages triggered a substitution of machinery for labor via more capital intensive production technology, consistent with the finding that family labor was more efficient than hired labor in 2008 but not in 1982 and 1999. Tests for separability between labor supply and labor demand further support the attenuation of labor market imperfection over time as one of the factors contributing to a weakening of the inverse farm size-productivity relationship.
Evidence on Evolution of the Farm SizeProductivity Relationship
To illustrate the issue at hand, Figure 1 plots results from locally weighted polynomial regressions of total monetary yield, valued at farm-gate price, against farm size for 1982, 1999, and 2008 . The 95% confidence intervals are also displayed. Between 1982 and 1999, farm size decreased significantly as a large number of very small farms emerged, presumably due to inheritance. This change led to a clear widening of the farm size distribution and a marked decline of mean holding size. Between 1982 and 1999, productivity increased markedly, though with little impact on the relation between farm size and productivity (the figure's slope). In the second period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , average productivity changed much less, and the relationship flatted out, largely due to differential performance by farms smaller than and larger than 1 ha, with productivity declining (though insignificantly at 5%) for the former but increasing (significantly at 5%) for the latter.
To appreciate the underlying factors, we denote households by i, communities by j, and time by t, to estimate a reduced-form output function relating output to factor endowments and cultivation area of the form 1982, 1999, and 2008 are β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 respectively. The values of less (more) than one imply a negative (positive) farm size-productivity relationship. If, for example, due to improved functioning of markets, the magnitude of this relationship decreased over time, the estimate of β 3 would be larger than the estimate of β 2 , which would be larger than the estimate of β 1 . Because of unobserved production shocks that may affect cultivated area, there is a possibility that E(lnA ijt ε ijt ) ≠ 0, so OLS could yield biased estimates of β's. To address potential endogeneity of cultivated area, we use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy in which the sizes of inherited land and assets serve as instruments, relying on the assumption of production shocks being independently distributed over time (Foster and Rosenzweig 2002) . Overidentification and weak instrument tests are used to check whether this is met in practice, and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level throughout. Table 1 reports results of estimating equation [1] . Columns 1-3 are, respectively, OLS estimates, FE estimates, and instrumented FE estimates (FE-IV). Because the instruments easily pass relevant tests in both cases, 9 we focus discussion on instrumented estimates in column 3. Although a negative farm size-productivity prevailed in all three periods, estimated elasticities increased from 0.713 in the initial 1982 period to 0.829 in 1999 and further to 0.933 in the last period, suggesting that the magnitude of the relationship decreased markedly over time. The differences between any two of three elasticities are also statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the coefficient on the share of irrigated land as well as that on household assets are both posi- 9 The Hansen J overidentification test (p-value = 0.576) and weak-IV tests (p-value = 0 from both the AndersonRubin Wald test and the Stock-Wright Lagrange multiplier test).
Figure 1
Changes in the Farm Size-Productivity Relationship, 1982 Relationship, , 1999 Relationship, , and 2008 tive and significant. The other household characteristics such as education, and composition are largely insignificant and less consistent.
Determinants of Factor Demand
To explore whether rising labor and other input costs may have led to substitution between different types of inputs, we estimate input demand equations for key inputs including machinery, fertilizer, and hired or family labor. Denoting households by i, villages by j, and time by t, input demand equations take the form where X ijt is the value (or, for labor, quantity) of input use; A ijt is the total crop area; w jt is the agricultural and nonagricultural wage rate; P jt is a vector of prices for output, machine rental, or fertilizer; H ijt is a vector of household-level controls, such as the head's gender, age, and education, and number of male members aged 14 to 64 years, number of female members aged 14 to 64 years, number of male members older than 64, number of female members older than 64; D t is a vector of year dummies; and α i is a household fixed effect. We are particularly interested in β 2 , the estimated elasticity of demand for different inputs with respect to wages. The corresponding elasticities in Table 2 suggest that increases in agricultural Note: The dependent variable is the output value in logs. Standard error is adjusted for clustering effect at the village level, and asymptotic t-ratios are given in parentheses. As discussed in the text, we instrument cultivated area using as instruments inherited land and assets, the number of male and female claimants, and the variance of their schooling, as well as the number of coresident brothers of the head. Constant is included throughout but not reported. Mean partial effect of year 1999 and 2008 is calculated and reported in the table for simplicity. FE, fixed effects; IV, instrumental variable; OLS, ordinary least squares.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
wages prompt a substitution of capital in the form of machinery (with an estimated elasticity of 0.26), fertilizer (0.38), and, to some extent, family labor (0.09) for hired labor. Overall labor intensity declines (with an elasticity of -0.18), as increased supply of family labor is not large enough to compensate for the decline in hired labor (-0.31). By contrast, higher nonfarm wages are estimated to have a similarly sized impact on machinery use (elasticity of 0.31), but a negative impact on the labor intensity of agricultural production (-0.09), as a reduction in family labor supply (-0.08) is only partly compensated for by increased use of hired labor (0.35). 10 Increases in the 10 In other words, regressions suggest that a 10.0% increase of the agricultural (nonagricultural) wage rate would result in an increase of rented machine use of 2.9% (3.1%), 
Exploring Changes in and Determinants of Labor Market Functioning
To test more directly whether labor market imperfections may have been a reason for the observed attenuation of the inverse farm size-productivity relationship from 1982 to 2008, we explore efficiency differences between family and hired labor, which may be indicative of supervision constraints. The results imply that such differences seem to have been present only in 1982 but not in 1999 or 2008; therefore, we test whether in 1999 and 2008 labor demand and supply were separable not only overall but also for villages with different levels of nonagricultural labor demand. 11 Separability is not rejected in the aggregate but rejected for villages with very little nonagricultural labor an increase in the use of fertilizer of 3.4%, and a 5.6% (1.0% but insignificant) and a 1.2% (0.9%) reduction in total labor use, respectively. 11 Another reason we include data from only the last two rounds of survey is because information on village-level nonfarm labor demand was not collected in the 1982 survey. demand, supporting the importance of nonagricultural labor markets in attenuating the negative farm size-productivity relationship over time.
Differences in Efficiency between Own and Hired Labor
The fact that wage workers require supervision by family members has long been viewed as a root cause of the inverse relationship (Frisvold 1994 ). Here we adopt Frisvold's approach in which the ratio of family labor to total labor is added to a standard production function. To do so, we estimate the following modified Cobb-Douglas production function: where lny ijt is the logarithm of output; lnI ijt is a vector of the logarithm of inputs including land, labor, seed, fertilizer, pesticide, machinery, irrigation, and other inputs; H ijt is a vector of household attributes; and the key addition is the logarithm of M ijt = (F ijt + 1)/L ijt , which is the ratio of family labor (F) to total labor. We further include the interaction terms between lnM ijt and each of the three year dummies (ln- D 2008 ) to test the relative efficiency over time. The sign and significance of each ρ provides a direct test for difference in efficiency between family labor and hired labor for a given year: a significantly positive (negative) value would imply that family labor is more (less) efficient than hired labor. The need for supervision varies by task, with transplanting and sowing as well as land preparation most in need of supervision. Availability of disaggregated labor data at the task level (plowing/land preparation, transplantation, weeding, etc.) in 1999 and 2008 provides a possibility to examine the relative efficiency between family and hired labor across different production tasks. Specifically, we run separate regressions of equation [3] , in which the last three terms (the labor ratio-year interaction terms) are replaced by the interaction terms between family and total labor ratio and three task-specific dummies. Table 3 reports the estimated results of equation [3] by year (columns 1-2) and by task (columns 3-4). While the FE results (columns 2 and 4) are preferred because unobserved household-level attributes including ability are controlled for, OLS results (columns 1 and 3) are also reported for comparison. Our interpretation is mainly based on the FE results. The significant and positive coefficient (0.08) on lnM ijt × D 1982 suggests that in 1982, an additional unit of hired labor added less to output than an additional unit of family labor, plausibly due to supervision constraints. By contrast, the coefficients of lnM ijt × D 1999 and lnM ijt × D 2007 are no longer significant, pointing toward disappearance of the productivity difference between hired labor and family labor, possibly due to greater use of machinery or capital-intensive methods of production that require less supervision and allow for easier monitoring. This result does not change when relevant ratios are entered separately for different production tasks (column 4). 12 A plausible explanation for this finding is that with wage growth, the mix of inputs for agricultural production shifted from labor toward machinery. Although Indian agriculture is a far cry from the highly skill-and data-intensive methods of modern precision farming, use of machinery reduces scope and need for supervision while also requiring hired workers to have higher levels of skill.
Testing for Separability between Labor Supply and Demand Decisions
In the presence of labor market frictions, households' labor endowment will affect total labor use, resulting in nonseparability between farm households' consumption (labor supply) and production (labor demand) decisions. An alternative to substitution of capital for labor is that farmers who may have been rationed out of nonagricultural labor markets in the first period may have been able to overcome 12 F-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the ratios of family labor to total labor for preharvest and harvest seasons are jointly insignificant for the regressions without IVs (column 5) and with IVs (column 6) at any conventional levels.
barriers to their participation in the second period, thus leading to the disappearance of the relationship. Following Benjamin (1992) , we can explore this by testing whether, if expected with well-functioning labor markets, the amount of labor used in agricultural production is independent of households' labor endowment. We estimate × D 2008 ). The regression analysis also distinguishes preharvest labor demand from total labor demand. The parameters of main interest are the vectors β, γ, and δ, and the absence of labor market imperfection in 1982, or 1999, or 2006 would imply β = 0, or γ = 0, or δ = 0 jointly for household size and all four household composition variables (i.e., number of male members 14-64, number of female members 14-64, number of male members >64, and number of female members >64). Table 4 , with columns 1-2 and columns 3-4 corresponding to preharvest labor demand and total labor demand, respectively. Again, our discussion is mainly based on the FE results (columns 2 and 4). The FE results in Table 4 suggest that in 1982, the household size and all four household composition variables had significant impacts on total and preharvest labor demand. The joint test for the coefficients of household size and all the composition variables being jointly Notes: Dependent variable is the log of output. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. All prices are in logarithms. Ratio = family to total labor ratio. Constant is included but not reported throughout. FE, fixed effects; OLS, ordinary least squares. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Table 4 ), pointing toward the absence of market imperfections in the last survey round, which is further supported by the fact that the null hypothesis that the coefficients of household size and the four composition variables being jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Overall, the results support the notion that labor market functioning did improve over time.
OLS and FE results based on equation [4] are reported in
As in the case of testing relative efficiency between own and hired labor, we also conducted separability tests by production tasks, using task-specific labor data from the last two rounds of survey. Results in Table 5 suggest that except for one variable in one production task, none of the demographic variables (household size and the four composition variables) are statistically significant across all the tasks. The joint hypothesis test that none of the demographic variables have significant effect on task-specific labor demand cannot be rejected for all the tasks, suggesting that the improved labor market condition in the later periods is not task specific.
Although results from estimating equation [4] fail to reject the hypothesis of labor market perfections in 2008 for the total sample, and in 1999 and 2008 for the task-specific subsample, we noted earlier that the negative relationship between farm size and productivity did not disappear entirely in the second period (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ). If this is a result of labor market imperfections, we should be able to document these empirically. Variation in nonagricultural labor demand across villages can provide a plausible cause of exogenous variation, and to explore whether it may play a role, we split sample villages into three equally sized groups with high, medium, and low levels of nonfarm labor demand, and we interacted household characteristics with dummies for each group to test for heterogeneity along this dimension in the 1999-2008 panel. 13 Results shown in Table 6 are for specifications in which we interacted total household size (columns 1 and 2) and other demographic variables (columns 3 and 4) with indicator variables for high, medium, and low levels of village-level activity in nonagricultural labor markets. Estimated coefficients provide 13 The level of nonfarm labor demand is measured by the share of nonfarm work to total work in the village. Such information is not available in the 1982 survey, so we use only the later panel for this analysis. Note: Dependent variable is the log of preharvest and total labor days used for agricultural production. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. Standard error is adjusted for clustering effect at the village level. All prices are in logarithms. Constant is included but not reported throughout. FE, fixed effects; OLS, ordinary least squares.
support for the hypothesis that low levels of nonagricultural labor demand are a key driver of observed labor market imperfections and most plausibly the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. Although the interactions indicate that household size is insignificant in villages with more active nonagricultural labor demand, the coefficient on household size interacted with a low level of nonfarm labor market activity is highly significant for preharvest and total labor (columns 1 and 2). The result is robust to the addition of more indicators of household composition. In addition to one of these indicators (share of elderly male adults) being significant for the group with low level of nonagricultural labor market activity, results from the test for joint significance on all household composition variables for the respective category (see the bottom rows of columns 3 and 4) reject the null hypothesis of coefficients on demographic variables jointly being equal to zero for this group. In contrast, these demographic variables are jointly insignificant for the Note: Dependent variable is the log of preharvest labor, total labor days, and labor days by task used for agricultural production. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. Standard error is adjusted for clustering effect at the village level. All prices are in logarithms. Constant is included throughout but not reported. FE, fixed effects.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Note: Dependent variable is the log of preharvest labor and total labor days used for agricultural production. Constant, time dummy, gender, education, and age of head and its square are included but not reported. Low, medium, and high refer to terciles of village-level demand for nonagricultural labor. t-Statistics are in parentheses. Constant is included throughout but not reported. FE, fixed effects.
groups with high and medium levels of nonagricultural labor market activity.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Although cross-country differences in nonagricultural productivity have long attracted attention in the literature (Hsieh and Klenow 2009) , differences of equal magnitude exist in agricultural production (Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2014a) . In fact, a number of studies have started to explore such differences, pointing toward imperfections in factor markets, especially those for land (Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis 2015) and labor, in addition to policies (Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2014b) as key factors. We complement this literature by using longitudinal data from India spanning the 1982-2008 period to examine how the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity evolved over time. The main finding that the relationship weakened significantly but did not disappear even in the last period (2008) can be attributed to two factors. Expanded technological options and real wage growth imply that capital was increasingly substituted for hired labor via mechanization of the production process, reducing the need for family labor-based supervision. However, improved functioning of rural labor markets via greater nonagricultural demand seems to have helped establish the preconditions for separability in the last period, possibly by allowing farmers who had earlier been rationed out to participate in such markets.
Our main finding is that over the 25 years considered, the inverse farm size-productivity relationship in India weakened in response to better functioning of labor markets. This not only provides an economically meaningful explanation of an empirically robust phenomenon but also has clear implications with respect to policies that have been suggested as ways to address this issue. Where, with low capital and knowledge intensity of farming, redistributive land reform could be implemented, it has helped increase small farmers' productivity and investment. 14 However, if market imperfections, the nature and severity of which are likely to change over time, have a significant impact, then a careful consideration of historical context and weighing of advantages and disadvantages of different options will be needed. 15 Although better labor market functioning can explain gradual disappearance of the inverse relationship overall, labor productivity in our data continues to diverge widely across producers. A plausible reason for this is that restrictions on the operation of land rental markets remain in place, and that as a result, land transactions are largely limited to often informal transfers among close kin (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010) . To the extent that our results relate to functioning of factor markets in general, measures to improve functioning of land markets, by amending regulations that currently ban leasing in many Indian states and by ensuring that land ownership records are up to date and reflect ground reality, could have a significant impact on agricultural productivity. 16 14 In India, land reform had positive impacts (Besley and Burgess 2000) , though it often did not target the poorest (Besley et al. 2016) , where it could be implemented (Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan 2009) . However, it triggered tenant evictions (Appu 1997) , which is consistent with implementation challenges in other contexts (Benjamin et al. 2012) . In India, with implementation having come to a virtual standstill, mechanisms used (such as prohibition of rentals) remain in place and undermine investment incentives (Deininger, Jin, and Yadav 2013) and land market functioning (Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan 2008) .
15 See Keswell and Carter (2014) for a recent study suggesting that in the context of South Africa, benefits from such reform can still outweigh the considerable costs incurred by such a policy. 16 Efforts in this direction have recently led to circulation of a model law to allow land leasing that can be adopted by states (NITI Aayog 2016).
